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[293] 
Whaling in Circles: The Makahs,  
the International Whaling Commission,  
and Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling 
Monder Khoury 
In Anderson v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit held that the International Whaling Commission 
(“IWC”) Schedule’s approval of a quota to hunt whales for the Native American Makah 
Tribe (“Makahs”) violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The implications of this 
holding were troubling: despite the U.S. government and the IWC approving, on domestic 
and international levels, the Makahs’ whaling proposal in the 1990s, the Makahs were still 
unable to hunt whales legally. The Makahs’ right to whale stemmed from the 1855 Neah 
Bay Treaty, an agreement between the Makahs and the U.S. government in which the 
government promised the Makahs the right to whale. However, the enactment of a 
domestic law called the Whaling Convention Act in 1949 superseded the treaty, rendering 
it void. 
 
Yet, enforcement of these domestic and international approvals presents problems. First, 
allowing the Makahs to resume whaling risks setting a dangerous precedent that will 
trigger a “domino effect,” causing other countries to resume whaling as well. Further, the 
international community might perceive the IWC’s approval of the Makahs’ whaling as 
favoritism to the United States. Such a perception might lead to further fragmentation of 
the global community regarding whaling. Accordingly, this Note suggests that the 
moratorium on whaling be lifted for specific whale stocks because oftentimes, a complete 
ban results in unnecessary and avoidable violations of the law. Further, this Note suggests 
that other countries be allowed to whale under science-based IWC regulations to achieve 
international consensus and yield better compliance. 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I would like to 
thank Professor David Takacs for inspiring me to explore this topic and for providing feedback and 
guidance in writing this Note. Many thanks to the Hastings Law Journal Notes team and other 
colleagues for their thoughtful feedback. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Abouna George and 
Amal Khoury, for their selfless support and continued sacrifice. 
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Introduction 
Whales are beautiful, majestic, and intelligent animals capable of 
feeling pain, yet are playful and humorous.1 Whales have roamed Earth’s 
seas for more than ten million years,2 and humans have been hunting 
whales for only a few thousand of those years.3 The Native American 
Makah Tribe (the “Makahs”), located in northwestern Washington,4 had 
 
 1. Rupa Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community: 
Accommodating Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1741, 1759 (1999). 
 2. Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Norwegian 
Uniform: An Analysis of Norway’s Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 Temp. Int’l & Comp. 
L.J. 155, 157 (1994). 
 3. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling 152 (1997). 
 4. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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hunted whales for thousands of years5 when they signed the Neah Bay 
Treaty (“Treaty”) with the U.S. government in 1855 for the right to 
continue whaling.6 However, in the 1920s, the Makahs voluntarily ceased 
whaling due to concerns with whale extinction as a result of commercial 
whaling.7 In 1946, the international whaling community established the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) in an 
attempt to regulate whaling globally.8 In the 1960s and 70s, the United 
States enacted the Whaling Convention Act (“WCA”) and the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), which prohibited whaling 
domestically.9 The IWC, an organ of the ICRW, implemented a complete 
ban on commercial whaling in 1986, but made an exception for aboriginal 
subsistence whaling.10 As a result, whaling became prohibited under both 
U.S. and international law. 
In the 1990s, the Makahs asked the U.S. government to allow them 
to resume subsistence whaling.11 However, under international and U.S. 
law, it remains unclear whether the U.S. government may allow its 
Native American tribes to hunt whales. That is, allowing the U.S. 
government to approve subsistence whaling opens the questions of who 
determines whether a tribe qualifies for an aboriginal subsistence 
exception under the IWC and who determines the makeup of the quota. 
When the Makahs wanted to resume whaling, the WCA had already 
superseded the Neah Bay Treaty, thus rendering the Makahs’ Treaty 
right to hunt whales void.12 Nonetheless, the U.S. government presented 
the Makahs’ proposal to the IWC and successfully obtained a quota on 
their behalf.13 However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently determined that 
the U.S. government’s representation of the Makahs violated domestic 
laws.14 Therefore, although the U.S. government and the IWC permitted 
the Makahs to hunt whales, they were still unable to do so legally.15 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Treaty of Neah Bay, U.S.-Makah, Jan. 31, 1855, 102 Stat. 939. 
 7. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137. 
 8. David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 1050 (4th ed. 2011). 
By 1946, the Makahs had voluntarily ceased whaling due to concerns with rapidly decreasing whale 
stocks. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137. 
 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2013). 
 10. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.7 (2002) (prohibiting the taking or killing of 
gray whales except where whale meat and products will be used by aborigine subsistence); Brian T. 
Hodges, The Cracking Facade of the International Whaling Commission as an Institution of 
International Law: Norwegian Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. 
Envtl. L. & Litig. 295, 303–04 (2000). 
 11. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1138. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B.  
 13. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140; see also Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1013. 
 14. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1135; Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1006. 
 15. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1135; Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1006. 
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Parts I and II of this Note provide a brief history of whaling and the 
Makahs, followed by international and U.S. laws regarding whaling in 
Parts III and IV. Part IV also discusses the reasons the Ninth Circuit 
ruled against the Makahs’ whaling plans in two cases. Part V focuses on 
the current fragmentation within the international community and the 
risks of allowing the Makahs to hunt whales. Part VI explains the current 
state of whaling and the revival of certain whale stocks. Finally, Part VII 
of this Note presents a viable solution: lifting the moratorium and 
allowing whaling to resume for specific whale stocks under science-based 
IWC regulations. This will also clarify whether the U.S. government may 
allow certain Native American tribes to hunt whales and how the quota 
is to be determined. 
I.  History of Whaling 
Humans have been whaling for thousands of years,16 using nearly 
every part of the animal.17 Traditionally, humans ate the whales’ meat, 
organs, and blubber, and used baleen, oil, and bones for various 
purposes.18 Whales were considered “a free resource, a gift from nature 
available to anyone who would hunt and kill them.”19 Before the Basques 
of Biscay, modern-day Spain, initiated industrialized and organized 
whaling in the eleventh century,20 humans lacked the necessary 
technology to catch whales in large numbers, and overexploitation was 
not an issue.21 Whaling gradually increased, and by the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, whaling spread to the North Atlantic where the 
Dutch and the British had begun whaling.22 Less than a century later, 
several whale species were on the verge of extinction.23 Throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whaling brought “untold wealth” to 
nations and “their national treasuries.”24 And in the nineteenth century, 
whale carcasses were worth over $2000, making whaling a highly 
 
 16. See Stoett, supra note 3. 
 17. Sarah Suhre, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling 
Commission’s Shift from a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation, 12 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 
305, 307 (1999); Meghan E. Marrero & Stuart Thornton, Big Fish: A Brief History of Whaling, Nat’l 
Geographic (Nov. 1, 2011), http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/news/big-fish-history-
whaling/. 
 18. See Suhre, supra note 17; see Marrero & Thornton, supra note 17. 
 19. Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 21, 28 (1991). 
 20. Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White 
Whale of Preservationism, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 375, 389 (2009); see also Suhre, 
supra note 17. 
 21. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20. 
 22. Id.; see also Suhre, supra note 17. 
 23. See Suhre, supra note 17. 
 24. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20. 
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profitable industry.25 Although whaling began having a noticeable 
negative impact on whale stocks, the short-term economic incentive 
deterred nations from ceasing whaling, “leading to what we would now 
consider to be a classic instance of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’”26 
Americans began whaling in the eighteenth century, and by the 
nineteenth century, they had developed “one of the world’s leading 
whaling fleets,” which depleted whale stocks on America’s coasts.27 In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, technological 
developments made whaling easier and more efficient than ever.28 
Whaling technology at that stage included harpoon guns and floating 
factory ships powered by steam engines, which enabled whalers to catch 
faster moving and larger whales, and to load them onto the floating 
factory ships.29 As a result, “more whales were killed in the first forty 
years of the twentieth century than in the previous four hundred years.”30 
During that time, countries became concerned with the depleting whale 
stocks worldwide and began regulating commercial whaling activities in 
order to prevent whales from going extinct.31 
II.  The Makahs and Whaling 
The Makah Tribe is a Native American tribe that still resides on 
Washington’s Olympic Peninsula.32 The Makahs have a 1500-year 
tradition of whale hunting,33 but old deposits found on Makah territory, 
including barbs from harpoons and gray whale bones, date back 2000 
years.34 Unlike the global trend, however, the Makahs did not engage in 
commercial whaling. Rather, they hunted for subsistence and cultural 
purposes.35 Whales once accounted for up to eighty percent of the 
Makahs subsistence, “and the rigorous training and preparation required 
 
 25. Id. at 390. In 1875, $2000 was equivalent to over $40,000 in 2014. See Relative Values – US $, 
MeasuringWorth.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (using Initial Year of 1875, Initial Amount $2000, 
and Desired Year 2014). 
 26. Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 390–91. “Tragedy of the commons” occurs when independent 
actors progressively exploit and ultimately destroy a common resource. See The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law 557 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
 27. See Stein, supra note 2, at 159. 
 28. Id. at 159–61. 
 29. Id.; see also Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 391. 
 30. David S. Lessoff, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination of American and International 
Failures to Adequately Protect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 413, 417 
(1996). 
 31. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 391–92. 
 32. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Lawrence Watters & Connie Dugger, The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native 
American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 319, 323 
(1997). 
 35. Id. 
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for a hunt involved the entire community.”36 For the Makahs, “[w]haling 
provided not merely food, clothing and shelterit formed an integral 
part of the world view, heritage, and identity.”37 
The Makahs are known to target the Eastern North Pacific gray 
whale, whose annual migration passes near the Olympic Peninsula.38 In 
1855, the Makahs signed the Neah Bay Treaty with the U.S. government, 
relinquishing most of their land in exchange for the continued right to 
whale.39 In the 1920s, the Makahs voluntarily ceased whaling because 
“the widespread commercial whaling had devastated the population of 
gray whales almost to extinction.”40 At that time, estimates of the gray 
whale population were less than 5000.41 Thus, “notwithstanding the 
important cultural role this practice played in their community,” the 
Makahs did not hunt whales for the next seventy years.42 The Makahs 
thought of this as a temporary solution and always planned to resume 
whaling once the whale stocks had recovered.43 
In 1970, nearly fifty years after the Makahs ceased whaling, the gray 
whale was on the endangered species list created by the domestic 
Endangered Species Act.44 By 1993, the Eastern North Pacific stock of 
gray whales recovered and was no longer in danger of extinction.45 The 
following year, the gray whale was no longer on the endangered species 
list.46 Subsequently, the Makahs decided to revive their important 
cultural practice of whaling.47 The Makah leaders claimed that resuming 
whaling would “not only contribute to the [Makahs’] subsistence and 
economic needs, but it [would] also help to revive a sense of community, 
self-worth and spirituality.”48 However, by the 1990s, the ICRW, and its 
domestic counterpart, the WCA, prohibited whaling all together. As a 
result, the Makahs had to go through domestic and international hurdles 
to resume whaling. 
 
 36. Id. at 323–25. 
 37. Id. at 325. 
 38. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34. In 2007, estimates of the same stock were between 17,000 and 
22,000. Whale Population Estimates, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/estimate#table (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 42. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137. 
 43. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34. 
 44. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1138. This Act was previously known as the Endangered Species 
Conservation Act of 1969. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 324. 
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III.  The International Convention for the  
Regulations of Whaling 
One of the major international hurdles that the Makahs faced was 
the ICRW, which ultimately led to the implementation of the 
moratorium. The international community established the ICRW in 1946 
due to concerns with over-hunting whales49 and pressure from the United 
States and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).50 Since its 
establishment, the ICRW has become the dominant international 
agreement regulating whaling.51 Because the ICRW’s regulations extend 
to all waters in which whaling occurs, it protects whales throughout their 
migration.52 The ICRW’s original goal was to provide a system for 
managing whale fishery stocks at a sustainable level.53 However, the 
preamble’s contradictory goals of biodiversity conservation and fishery 
management have sparked a debate over the ICRW’s true purpose.54 
Nonetheless, since its creation, the ICRW’s mandate has undoubtedly 
shifted from regulations of whaling fishery to a moratorium, or a 
complete ban, on commercial whaling.55 The ICRW implemented the 
moratorium through the IWC. 
A. The IWC and Its Rival 
Article III of the ICRW created the IWC, which ultimately 
implemented the moratorium on commercial whaling.56 The IWC is 
considered the “ICRW’s most important innovation,”57 and is composed 
of one member from each “Contracting Government.”58 Although the 
IWC has no enforcement authority, Contracting Governments are 
required to report the number of all hunted whales to the IWC.59 The 
IWC uses the data from these reports, studies, and investigations to 
determine the level of protection necessary for certain whale stocks.60 
Such protections become part of the ICRW Schedule61 through 
 
 49. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1849. 
 50. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 321–32. 
 51. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1049. 
 52. Id. at 1050. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1050–54. 
 57. Id. at 1050. 
 58. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. III. 
Contracting Government is “any Government which has deposited an instrument of ratification or has 
given notice of adherence to this Convention.” Id. at art. II. 
 59. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1051. 
 60. Id. at 1050–51. 
 61. The ICRW Schedule is “[a]n integral part of the Convention” and is legally binding on a 
Contracting Government. History and Purpose, Int’l Whaling Commission, https://iwc.int/history-
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amendments, which require a three-fourths majority vote of the 
Contracting Governments in order to pass.62 
The moratorium includes two exceptions. The first is an exception 
for scientific research specifically outlined in Article VIII of the ICRW.63 
This exception will only be briefly discussed below in Part III.B, as it is 
outside the scope of this Note. The second exception, which is the focus 
of this Note, is the aboriginal subsistence exception.64 This exception 
originally65 allowed for the taking or killing of whales “when the meat 
and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local 
consumption by the aborigines.”66 The IWC has recognized the 
difference between aboriginal subsistence whaling and commercial 
whaling since the IWC’s establishment.67 While commercial whaling 
seeks to maximize catches and profit, aboriginal whaling is practiced for 
cultural and survival purposes.68 
Despite the inclusion of two exceptions, the moratorium did not 
appease everyone, and since its implementation, the global community 
has been fragmented regarding whaling.69 In 2000, the IWC’s secretary of 
twenty-four years retired and issued a stark warning: 
Whaling is going on at a commercial level. It’s outside IWC control. I 
would think it much better that it was brought within international 
regulations and oversight. I think the [IWC] will need to move forward 
in measures which would allow controlled whaling, otherwise it will 
lose credibility. If the [IWC] cannot set its house in order, people will 
start to ask: “Why do we need it at all?”70 
While some countries, including the United States, support the 
moratorium, others have lodged objections to it and therefore are not 
bound by it.71 The moratorium went into effect in 1986 and was supposed 
 
and-purpose (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). It “sets out specific measures that the IWC has collectively 
decided are necessary in order to regulate whaling and conserve whale stocks.” Id. 
 62. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1051. 
 63. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. VIII. 
 64. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.7 (2002) (prohibiting the taking or killing of 
gray whales except where whale meat and products will be used by aborigine subsistence). 
 65. The IWC has amended the original language of the exception. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 
1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 66. See Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1012 n.7; see also International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, supra note 49, at art. V; Hodges, supra note 10, at 301. 
 67. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/aboriginal (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 68. Id.; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 303. 
 69. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 324. 
 70. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1059. 
 71. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 303; see also Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054. Pursuant to 
ICRW Article V, section 3, an amendment “shall become effective with respect to all Contracting 
Governments which have not presented objection but shall not become effective with respect to any 
Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn.” International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. V, § 3 (emphasis added). 
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to provide for a cessation of all commercial whaling—rather than an 
outright ban of all whaling—until a comprehensive review was 
completed.72 However, in 1990, upon completion of the review, the IWC 
decided to extend the moratorium.73 The controversial decision led to the 
resignation of the head of the IWC Scientific Committee, who accused 
“the IWC of treating the committee’s unanimous recommendations with 
contempt.”74 
Frustrated with the continuing moratorium, Iceland, Norway, 
Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands created the North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission (“NAMMCO”), a new “rival”75 international 
whaling institution in 1992.76 The creation of NAMMCO, in and of itself, 
challenged the legitimacy of the IWC.77 NAMMCO is similar to the IWC 
in several respects. NAMMCO “focuses on modern approaches to the 
study of the marine ecosystem as a whole, and to understanding better 
the role of marine mammals in this system.”78 NAMMCO also calls for 
cooperation in the conservation and management of whales and other 
marine mammals.79 The most important difference between NAMMCO 
and the IWC, however, is that NAMMCO does not prohibit all 
commercial whaling. Instead, NAMMCO allocates whaling quotas based 
on scientific data and sustainable management efforts.80 NAMMCO 
provides an alternative for countries that decide to withdraw from the 
IWC81 or opt out of specific IWC obligations, for instance, complying 
with the moratorium.82 
The IWC was intended to provide a framework for international 
whaling regulation. However, the IWC’s moratorium, even with its two 
exceptions, proved too strict for some countries. As a result, pro-whaling 
countries were forced to create their own regional regulatory body in 
order to continue whaling legally, which in turn challenged the legitimacy 
of the IWC. Consequently, the IWC’s moratorium further fragmented 
the international community regarding whaling. 
 
 72. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 314. 
 76. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Agreement, N. Atlantic Marine Mammal Comm’n, http://www.nammco.no/about-
nammco/nammco-agreement/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 79. About NAMMCO, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, http://www.nammco.no/ 
about-nammco (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 80. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 315. 
 81. See Japan Threatens to Set Up, or Join, Rival to IWC, Whale & Dolphin Conservation 
(Sept. 1, 2003, 4:30 PM) http://us.whales.org/news/2003/09/japan-threatens-to-set-up-or-join-rival-to-
iwc (discussing Japan’s consideration of joining NAMMCO). 
 82. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1057. 
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B. The Role and Influence of the United States and 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
The U.S. government is at the heart of IWC’s moratorium because it 
has taken a lead role in protecting whales.83 Because the IWC has no 
enforcement mechanism, conservation groups lobbied Congress to pass 
legislation that would give teeth to IWC regulations.84 Today, the main 
legal provision for enforcing international whaling regulations is 
contained in two pieces of U.S. law.85 The first is the Pelly Amendment to 
the Fishermen’s Protective Act.86 The Pelly Amendment authorizes the 
President to embargo wildlife products of foreign countries when those 
countries’ nationals engage “in trade or taking that diminishes the 
effectiveness of an international program in force with respect to the 
United States for the conservation of endangered or threatened 
species.”87 The second enforcement mechanism is the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act.88 Congress enacted the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to restrict 
the discretion in the Pelly Amendment through mandatory sanctions on 
violators.89 As a result, “the effectiveness of the IWC can be directly 
linked, in large part, to the United States’ willingness to support the IWC 
unilaterally[.]”90 
Although the United States gave the IWC moratorium teeth 
through the use of trade sanctions, the U.S. government has not had 
much success imposing sanctions on violators for two reasons.91 First, 
instead of imposing sanctions on violators, the United States has tried to 
use the threat of sanctions as a bargaining chip to obtain favorable future 
behavior.92 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted one of the laws 
“in a manner which has done little to strengthen the United States’ and 
IWC’s goal of preserving and protecting [whales.]”93 
 
 83. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424. 
 84. Id. at 418. 
 85. Id. at 424. 
 86. Id. at 424–27. 
 87. Pelly Amendment, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs. Int’l Affairs, http://www.fws.gov/international/ 
laws-treaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/pelly-amendment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 88. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 428–29. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 424. 
 91. Id. at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20. 
 92. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 418. 
 93. Id. at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20. On the international level, the 
effectiveness of the IWC can be realized through other means. For example, IWC member states may 
bring claims against other member states in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). See Hodges, 
supra note 10, at 325. The ICJ recently ruled on a claim brought by anti-whaling states against Japan, 
which prompted Japan to change its whaling practices to comply with international law obligations. 
See Cymie R. Payne, Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling, Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. (Apr. 8, 
2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-halts-antarctic-whaling; see 
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The United States’ support of the IWC goes beyond enacting 
domestic laws. Many scholars credit the United States for strengthening 
conservation policies at the IWC.94 In fact, some people claim that the 
IWC only adopted the whaling moratorium due to pressure from the 
United States and other anti-whaling nations.95 Others, in comparison, 
emphasize the role that NGOs, particularly Greenpeace and EarthTrust, 
played in shifting the debate from sustainable use to conservation.96 This 
shift in the debate, for example, ultimately led to the extension of the 
moratorium in 1990.97 These NGOs’ efforts are well documented98 and 
should not be underestimated. 
Individuals have also taken steps to stop whaling. In one anti-
whaling demonstration, hundreds of people formed a shape of a giant 
humpback on a Sydney beach.99 People have also peacefully 
demonstrated in the United Kingdom against the killing of whales.100 
However, not all demonstrations and protests are peaceful. The Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherds”) is an American non-
profit organization established in 1977 for the purpose of “shutting down 
illegal whaling.”101 The Sea Shepherds, known for their more militant 
tactics,102 have gained publicity in the past few years, due in part to an 
Animal Planet show entitled Whale Wars, which follows the Sea 
Shepherds as they attempt to stop Japanese whaling crews from hunting 
whales.103 The Sea Shepherds’ “primary tactics consist of ramming, 
sabotaging, and sinking whale vessels.”104 They use ships that are 
 
also Martin Fackler, Japan Plans to Resume Whaling Program, with Changes to Address Court 
Concerns, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/world/asia/japan-says-it-
will-resume-whaling-off-antarctica.html. That being said, some argue that “[t]he essential binding 
force can be found in ecopolitics, or normative environmental politics” and that the IWC should be 
seen as a normative institution rather than one of legal enforcement. Hodges, supra note 10, at 323. 
Under this theory, the anti-whaling coalition, led by the United States, would apply pressure on non-
adhering states in hopes of changing practices based upon a belief of right and wrong behavior. Id. at 
323–24. 
 94. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424–25; Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20; Watters & Dugger, 
supra note 34, at 331. 
 95. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 331. 
 96. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 332; Stein, supra note 2, at 180–82. 
 99. Stavros Teaching, Anti-Whaling Demonstration on Bondi Beach, Sydney, YouTube (Nov. 20, 
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfPyo_wbGRM. 
 100. Latin America News, Anti-whaling Demonstrations in UK 07-11-11, YouTube (July 11, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBAwN350xv0. 
 101. The History of Sea Shepherd, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, http://www.seashepherd.org/ 
who-we-are/our-history.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 102. See Stein, supra note 2, at 181. 
 103. See Whale Wars, Animal Planet, http://www.animalplanet.com/tv-shows/whale-wars/ (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 104. See Stein, supra note 2, at 182. 
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specifically designed and reinforced to “battle the whaling industry.”105 
During one of the Whale Wars episodes, Sea Shepherds and Japanese 
whaling ships collided on the high seas.106 Occasionally, Sea Shepherd 
crew members are arrested.107 Similar instances of protestors attacking 
and sinking whaling boats around the world have also been documented.108 
It is evident that the United States and NGOs have played an 
important role in supporting and strengthening conservation efforts at 
the international level. However, the U.S. government extended its 
conservation efforts to the domestic level by enacting several anti-
whaling legislative acts, which directly affect the Makahs’ plans to resume 
whaling. 
IV.  U.S. Laws and Court Decisions Affecting the Makahs’ Right to 
Whale 
Although the U.S. government approved the Makahs’ plans to 
resume whaling,109 several domestic U.S. laws have presented a challenge 
to the Makahs’ plans. Furthermore, as illustrated below, the Ninth 
Circuit has interpreted those domestic laws in favor of whale 
conservation and against the Makahs’ requests to resume whaling. 
A. Neah Bay Treaty 
The first legal instrument directly related to the Makahs’ whaling 
rights is the 1855 Neah Bay Treaty, which is an agreement between the 
U.S. government and the Makahs.110 In this Treaty, the Makahs agreed to 
“cede[], relinquish[], and convey[] to the United States all their right, 
title, and interest in and to the lands and country occupied by” the 
tribe.111 In exchange, the Makahs received “[t]he right of taking fish and 
of whaling or sealing.”112 The Neah Bay Treaty went into effect following 
its ratification on March 8, 1859.113 Significantly, the Treaty contained no 
expiration date or other provision suggesting when it would no longer be 
binding on the contracting parties.114 Although the Treaty provided the 
Makahs with the right to whale, the superceding enactment of a domestic 
 
 105. Id. at 182 n.280. 
 106. Whale Wars: Ships Collide in Final Confrontation, Animal Planet, http://www.animalplanet. 
com/tv-shows/whale-wars/videos/ships-collide-in-final-confrontation/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 107. See Stein, supra note 2, at 182; see also Agence France Presse, Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd 
Founder, Disembarks in U.S. for First Time in Months, Huffington Post (Dec. 31, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/paul-watson-sea-shepherd-us_n_4183030.html. 
 108. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 312. 
 109. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1138–42 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 110. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 6. 
 111. Id. at art. 1. 
 112. Id. at art. IV (emphasis added). 
 113. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 6. 
 114. Id. 
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law rendered the Makahs’ Treaty rights void, including the right to hunt 
whales. Over a century passed before the Makahs realized how difficult it 
would be to reap their end of the bargain. 
B. The Whaling Convention Act’s Effect on the Neah Bay Treaty 
In 1946, nearly a century after the U.S. government entered into the 
Neah Bay Treaty, the United States signed the ICRW.115 Three years 
later, Congress passed the Whaling Convention Act (“WCA”) to 
implement the ICRW domestically.116 Still in effect today, the WCA 
prohibits whaling in violation of the ICRW, any IWC regulations, and 
any regulations adopted by the Secretary of Commerce.117 
Although the WCA is silent as to the Neah Bay Treaty, the 
enactment of the WCA rendered the Treaty void because Congress 
retains the power to unilaterally modify or abrogate a treaty by later 
acts.118 This has become known as the “last in time” principle, which 
suggests that when two statutesor as in this case, a treaty and a 
statuteconflict, the one enacted later in time prevails.119 In United States 
v. Dion,120 the U.S. Supreme Court established a test to determine which 
statute prevails if the later statute, as here, is silent regarding the first 
statute. The Court stated: “What is essential is clear evidence (1) that 
Congress actually considered the conflict between the intended action on 
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and (2) chose to 
resolve that conflict (3) by abrogating the treaty.”121 
In the case of the Neah Bay Treaty and the WCA, the first prong of 
the test is met because Congress considered a potential conflict between 
the WCA and Indian treaty rights generally. In Dion, the Court did not 
find dispositive the fact that Congress was not aware of the specific treaty 
at issue.122 Rather, Congress’ general awareness of a potential conflict 
between Indian treaty rights and the new statute was sufficient to satisfy 
 
 115. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 300. 
 116. Id. at 301. 
 117. 16 U.S.C. § 916(c) (2013). 
 118. Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). 
 119. Leesteffy Jenkins & Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Subsistence or a Stepping 
Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling Moratorium?, 9 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 71, 
104 (1998). 
 120. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). In Dion, a Native American defendant from the Yankton Sioux Tribe 
was convicted of shooting four bald eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act, which 
prohibited the hunting of bald eagles in the United States absent a Secretary of the Interior permit. 
Id. at 735–36. The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction, relying on the defendant’s treaty right to hunt 
bald eagles. Id. at 736. Under the treaty, the Yanktons ceded their land to the U.S. government in 
exchange for, inter alia, the right to hunt and fish on their land. Id. at 737. Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the enactment of certain laws abrogated the Yanktons’ treaty right. 
Id. at 745. 
 121. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739–40. 
 122. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 108. 
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the first prong of the test.123 Therefore, here, it is irrelevant whether 
Congress knew of the Neah Bay Treaty at the time it enacted the WCA, 
so long as it knew about Indian treaty rights regarding whaling generally. 
It further appears that Congress was aware of a potential conflict with 
the Neah Bay Treaty because Congress specifically incorporated into the 
WCA the aboriginal subsistence exception of the IWC.124 This further 
shows that Congress considered that the WCA might affect some Indian 
treaty rights. Therefore, the first prong is met. 
As for the second and third prongs,125 “[t]he WCA specifically and 
unequivocally incorporate[d] the ICRW and the IWC amended 
Schedule.”126 Similar to the statute at issue in Dion, the WCA prohibition 
is “sweepingly framed . . . [and] ‘exhaustive and careful.’”127 The WCA 
specifically mentions what activities are unlawful,128 has an enforcement 
mechanism,129 and lists penalties and fines.130 Moreover, the incorporation 
of the aboriginal subsistence exception into the WCA “reveals a 
congressional intent to resolve this tension in favor of creating a specific 
exemption and quota to supersede any previous treaty rights to whale.”131 
The incorporation of the aboriginal subsistence exception into the WCA 
is difficult to explain “except as a reflection of an understating that the 
statute otherwise bans the taking of [whales] by Indians, a recognition 
that such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a 
decision that that problem should be solved not by exempting Indians 
from the coverage of the statute,” but by providing an exception in 
narrow circumstances.132 Therefore, the second and third prongs are also 
met to conclude that the WCA supersedes the Neah Bay Treaty.133 As a 
result, the Treaty is void and the Makahs can no longer claim to have a 
right to hunt whales under the Treaty. Unfortunately for the Makahs, 
other domestic laws and court decisions prohibiting whaling pose 
additional legal hurdles. 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 107. 
 125. The second and third prongs state that Congress chose to resolve the conflict between the 
intended action and the treaty right (second prong), by abrogating the treaty (third prong). Dion, 476 
U.S. at 739–40. 
 126.  Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 106. 
 127. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740. 
 128. 16 U.S.C. § 916 (c) (2013). 
 129. Id. § 916 (g). 
 130. Id. § 916 (f). 
 131. Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 107. 
 132. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740. 
 133. This explains why neither the Makahs nor the U.S. government argued that the Neah Bay 
Treaty acts as an exception to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, discussed infra Part IV.D. The lack 
of such an argument suggests that the U.S. government, during its representation of the Makahs, was 
aware of the fact that the WCA superseded the Neah Bay Treaty. 
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C. National Environmental Policy Act 
In 1970, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment” and “to promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment.”134 The NEPA requires federal 
agencies to take a “hard look” at and consider the environmental impact 
of their actions.135 Under § 4332 of the NEPA, an Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) must be prepared any time the “actions [of Federal 
agencies] significantly [affect] the quality of the human environment.”136 
However, in deciding whether to prepare an EIS, government agencies 
may rely on a less formal process known as an Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”).137 Depending on the EA’s finding, the agency will 
then complete an EIS or submit a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(“FONSI”).138 Today, the NEPA is viewed as a statute that sets out 
“action-forcing” procedural requirements and attempts to “promote 
environmentally sensitive governmental decisionmaking, without 
prescribing any substantive standards.”139 Therefore, in order for a 
government agency to assist the Makahs in obtaining a whaling quota, 
that agency must comply with NEPA requirements by taking a hard look 
at the environmental impact of such a quota. 
D. Marine Mammal Protection Act 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(“MMPA”).140 The MMPA implemented a moratoriuma complete 
cessation of the taking of marine mammals, including whales, absent a 
permit or waiver.141 The only explicit exemption from the MMPA’s 
prohibition on the taking of marine mammals is provided in § 1371(b) 
and applies to Alaskan natives only.142 Section 1372(a)(2) provides an 
exception for the MMPA’s prohibition when the takings are “expressly 
provided for by an international treaty, convention, or agreement to 
which the United States is a party and which was entered into before 
[1972] or by any statute implementing any such treaty, convention, or 
agreement.”143 The MMPA’s prohibition, still in effect, presents a 
challenge to the Makahs’ plans to resume whaling. 
 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013). 
 135. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 136. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2013). 
 137. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1017. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1016; see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 140. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2013). 
 141. Id. §§ 1371–1372; see also Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023 (Gould, J., concurring). 
 142. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2013). 
 143. Id. § 1372 (a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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E. Ninth Circuit Decisions 
In the following two cases, the Ninth Circuit considered the Makahs’ 
plans and requests to resume whaling in the contexts of the WCA, 
NEPA, and MMPA. In the first case, Metcalf v. Daley,144 the Ninth 
Circuit examined the Makahs’ plan to revive its culture and resume 
whaling after the gray whale was removed from the endangered species 
list in 1994.145 In this case, the Makahs had asked the U.S. Department of 
Commerce for help with developing and presenting their plan to the 
IWC.146 Following an evaluation of the Makahs’ request, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), a division of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, decided to support the Makahs’ plan.147 
However, in the process of their support, the NOAA failed to comply 
with the NEPA requirements by not publishing an EA or EIS for public 
review.148 
In 1996, NOAA and the Makahs entered into a formal, written 
agreement, whereby NOAA committed to present the Makahs’ proposal 
to the IWC after the Makahs prepared an adequate statement of need.149 
Later that year, the U.S. government presented a formal proposal to the 
IWC on behalf of the Makahs.150 However, several IWC member nations 
“expressed concerns and indicated that they would vote against” the 
proposal.151 Such concern and opposition derived partially from within 
the Makahs themselves because the Makah Tribal Council’s process of 
obtaining a quota did not include a referendum on the issue.152 The 
proposal also faced opposition from U.S. politicians and NGOs.153 The 
United States subsequently withdrew the IWC proposal when it realized 
that the proposal lacked the support it needed to pass.154 
In 1997, NOAA became aware of the possibility that it violated 
NEPA, and in order to comply, prepared an EA followed by a FONSI.155 
Prior to the 1997 IWC meeting, the U.S. and Russian governments 
considered submitting a joint proposal requesting a gray whale quota for 
the Makahs of the United States and for the Chukotka, a Siberian 
aboriginal tribe located in Russia.156 This was a strategic alliance by the 
 
 144. 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 145. Id. at 1138. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1139. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 332–34. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140. 
 155. Id. at 1139–40. 
 156. Id. at 1140. 
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United States because the IWC had previously granted a gray whale 
quota for the Siberian Chukotka.157 Subsequently, the U.S. government 
submitted a joint proposal with Russia, asking for a quota of 620 whales 
over a five-year period.158 During the IWC meeting, however, it became 
clear that some of the delegates thought that the Makahs did not qualify 
for the aboriginal subsistence exception.159 At that time, the IWC defined 
aboriginal subsistence whaling as “whaling for the purposes of local 
aboriginal consumption carried out by or on behalf of aboriginal, 
indigenous or native peoples who share strong community, familial, 
social and cultural ties related to a continuing traditional dependence on 
whaling and the use of whales.”160 This posed a problem for the Makahs 
because they had lived without whales for seventy years and therefore 
did not meet the “continuing traditional dependence” aspect of the 
definition.161 Nonetheless, after negotiations, the IWC approved the 
quota and “the delegates agreed to amend the proposal to allow the 
quota to be used only by aboriginal groups ‘whose traditional subsistence 
and cultural needs have been recognized.’”162 However, to date, it 
remains unclear who is responsible for recognizing such subsistence and 
cultural needs. 
In 1997, on the same day NOAA released the FONSI, Congressman 
Jack Metcalf of Washington, along with various organizations concerned 
about whaling (herein “appellants”), filed a complaint against the U.S. 
government and the Makahs (herein “federal defendants”) for violating 
NEPA.163 The appellants appealed the district court’s decision granting 
the federal defendants’ motion for summary judgment.164 In determining 
whether the federal defendants violated NEPA, the Ninth Circuit relied 
on a Supreme Court decision165 in which the Court held that an EIS 
“shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis [go/no-go] stage.”166 In other 
words, the federal defendants should have prepared the EA, and 
subsequently EIS or FONSI, before they signed a formal, written 
agreement with the Makahs.167 The Ninth Circuit held that the federal 
defendants’ commitment to helping the Makahs before preparing an EA 
“probably influenced their evaluation of the environmental impact of the 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. The Makahs would have been entitled to only a fraction of the 620 whales. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 304 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1141. 
 165. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 166. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979)). 
 167. Id. at 1143, 1145. 
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proposal.”168 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal 
defendants violated NEPA by preparing an untimely EA and failing to 
prepare an EIS.169 
Merely two years after Metcalf, the government’s approval of the 
Makahs’ whaling plans faced yet another legal challenge.170 In Anderson 
v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit once again found the federal government in 
violation of NEPA.171 Here, however, the court concluded that even 
though the government prepared a timely EA, it violated NEPA by 
preparing a FONSI instead of an EIS.172 The court reasoned that “there 
[were] substantial questions remaining as to whether the [Makahs’] 
whaling plans [would] have a significant effect on the environment,” and 
therefore, the government should have prepared an EIS.173 
In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also found the government in 
violation of the MMPA for improperly approving the Makahs’ whaling 
plan in 1997.174 Section 1372 of the MMPA provides for an exception to 
the blanket moratorium on whaling.175 This exception applies when 
whaling has been “expressly provided for by an international treaty, 
convention, or agreement to which the United States is a party and which 
was entered into before [1972] or by any statute implementing any such 
treaty, convention, or agreement.”176 The court held that the exception 
did not apply here for four reasons.177 First, the IWC Schedule that 
approved the Makahs’ quota passed in 1997, well after the 1972 cutoff 
date allowed by the exception.178 Second, even if the 1997 IWC Schedule 
related back to the 1946 Convention and predated the MMPA, the IWC 
Schedule expressly failed “to provide any whaling quota for the 
[Makahs]” as required by the MMPA’s exception.179 Third, the express 
requirement of § 1372(a)(2) was not satisfied due to the vague definition 
of the IWC’s aboriginal subsistence exception and the uncertainty as to 
who conducts the recognition.180 Fourth, “there [was] no domestic statute 
implementing the ICRW that expressly permit[ed] the [Makahs’] 
 
 168. Id. at 1145. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 171. Id. at 1009. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1030. 
 175. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (a)(2) (2013). 
 176. 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (a)(2) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 177. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023–25. 
 178. Id. at 1023–24. 
 179. Id. at 1024–25. 
 180. Id. at 1025. 
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whaling.”181 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the government 
violated the MMPA by approving the Makahs’ whaling plan.182 
As a result of these two cases, the Makahs could not legally hunt 
whales under domestic law. The cases illustrate the challenges and 
complications of approving the Makahs’ proposals under domestic laws. 
However, beyond violating domestic laws, the Makahs’ proposals present 
significant issues on an international level. 
V.  The Makahs’ Proposal: International Problems,  
Precedent, and Perception 
There is no doubt that the Makahs had a long and demonstrable 
tradition of whaling for both nutritional and cultural purposes.183 
However, the Makahs voluntarily ceased hunting whales in the 1920s—
nearly half a century before the moratorium went into effect—and 
continued to survive without whale meat as a source of subsistence.184 For 
that reason, the Makahs’ petition to the IWC focused on the importance 
of whaling to the Makahs’ culture, rather than on their nutritional 
dependency on whale meat.185 The Makahs’ culture-based proposal was 
problematic because until the IWC’s approval of the Makahs’ quota, the 
IWC had only granted the exception to groups that had consistently 
relied upon whale meat for nutritional and cultural needs.186 To solve the 
problem, the United States amended its domestic subsistence regulations 
to allow for whaling based on “cultural and/or subsistence” need.187 The 
United States also lobbied the delegates at the IWC and amended the 
aboriginal subsistence exception to groups “whose traditional subsistence 
and cultural needs have been recognized.”188 By doing so, the U.S. 
government fit the Makahs within a domestic exception because of the 
“and/or” language, and was able to formally recognize the Makahs’ 
“traditional subsistence and cultural needs” as required by the amended 
IWC definition. However, “[c]onspicuously absent from [the IWC 
definition] is any delineation of who must [conduct this] recognition and 
how.”189 Because it remains unclear who has the authority to “recognize” 
these needs, any country can claim such recognition on behalf of its 
aboriginal communities.190 The Ninth Circuit recognized the danger of 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1030. 
 183. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320. 
 184. Id.; see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 185. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320. 
 186. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 341. 
 187. 50 C.F.R. § 230.2 (1996); see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 320. 
 188. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140. 
 189. Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 190. Id. 
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the tactics used by the United States191 and warned: “[These tactics] could 
be used as a precedent for other countries to declare the subsistence need 
of their own aboriginal groups, thereby making it easier for such groups 
to gain approval for whaling.”192 
The real concern here is that other countries, such as Japan and 
Norway, have aboriginal communities that technically meet the new IWC 
definition,193 yet have been consistently denied applications for aboriginal 
whaling.194 Thus, in allowing the Makahs to hunt under the aboriginal 
subsistence exception based on a purely cultural needs, the IWC set a 
precedent that would open the door for other communities to put forth 
and rely on similar cultural-needs claims.195 In fact, some argue that other 
communities will likely have even stronger cultural claims than that 
shown by the Makahs.196 Broadening the aboriginal subsistence exception 
would have a “domino effect”197 that will create the “danger of rendering 
the commercial whaling moratorium essentially meaningless.”198 Therefore, 
the Makahs’ proposals present significant issues on the international level, 
which require careful attention and consideration. 
VI.  The Current State of and Issues Faced by Whaling 
Although the Ninth Circuit held against the Makahs’ plan, the 
IWC’s approval of the quota is still technically valid for IWC aboriginal 
subsistence exception purposes.199 The IWC currently lists five 
indigenous people with approved quotas to hunt whales under the 
aboriginal subsistence exception, including native Alaskans (“Inuits”), 
 
 191. This entails, in essence, the changing and tailoring of domestic law to fit aboriginals within an 
exception or setting aboriginals outside the reach of anti-whaling laws. 
 192. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1022. 
 193. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320 n.155; see also Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 88–92. 
 194. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 337; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 325, 327–28; see, 
e.g., IWC Resolution 1996-1, Int’l Whaling Commission, https://archive.iwc.int/pages/ 
view.php?ref=2072&search=%21collection72&offset=0&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&archive=0&k=
&go=next&curpos=14& (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (presenting resolution for distressed coastal Japanese 
communities dependant on whaling for cultural, social, dietary, and economic needs); IWC Resolution 1990-1, 
Int’l Whaling Commission, https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=2066&search=%21collection72& 
offset=0&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&archive=0&k=&go=next&curpos=14& (last visited Dec. 18, 
2015). 
 195. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note, 119, at 93–95; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, 
at 337. 
 196. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note, 119, at 95–96; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28. 
 197. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 320; see also Brenda Peterson, Who Will Speak for 
the Whales?—Elders Call for a Spiritual Dialogue on Makah Tribe’s Whaling Proposal, Seattle Times 
(Dec. 22, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961222&slug
=2366339. 
 198. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 94. 
 199. Ninth Circuit decisions are only binding domestically and do not affect the IWC. 
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Chukotkas, and Makahs.200 The Chukotka and Makahs had a combined 
approved quota of 620 Eastern North Pacific gray whales from 2008 to 
2012.201 According to the IWC, the Makahs have caught two gray whales 
under the aboriginal subsistence exception: the first in 1999 and the 
second in 2007.202 As of 2007, the Eastern North Pacific gray whale stock 
was estimated between 17,000 and 22,000.203 According to the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) Red 
List204 and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), two sources 
the IWC relies on for scientific reports,205 the gray whale is no longer in 
danger of extinction.206 The IUCN Red List has nine categories, ranking 
from “Not Evaluated” species to “Extinct” species.207 The IUCN Red 
List has the gray whale under its “Least Concern” category, three full 
categories away from the “Endangered” list.208 The mere fact that the 
quota was approved under the IWC’s strict standards shows that the 
Makahs’ proposed quota would not have had a significant negative 
impact on the whale stock. A spokesperson for the NMFS, an organ of 
NOAA, stated, “There isn’t any question about the biological impact of 
[the Makahs] taking 20 whales over the course of five years out of a 
population of 20,000 gray whales . . . Its impact would be . . . 
insignificant.”209 
The combined approved quota under the aboriginal subsistence 
exception is about a third of the number of whales hunted every year for 
 
 200. Catch Limits & Catches Taken, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/ 
index.php?cID=html_76#aborig (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Catches Taken: ASW, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/table_aboriginal (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015). 
 203. Whale Population Estimates, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/estimate#table (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 204. The IUCN is a leading authority on the conservation status of species. The IUCN Red List’s 
goal is “[t]o provide information and analyses on the status, trends and threats to species in order to 
inform and catalyse action for biodiversity conservation.” Overview of the IUCN Red List, 
Introduction, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/ 
overview#introduction (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 205. Status of Whales, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/status (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 206. Eschrichtius Robustus, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 
details/summary/8097/0 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Endangered and Threatened Marine 
Species Under NMFS’ Jurisdiction, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
pr/species/esa/listed.htm#mammals (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 207. Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 14–15 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 208. Eschrichtius Robustus, supra note 206. 
 209. Eric Rosenberg, Makah Hopeful About Whaling Again by 2010, Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
(Jan. 13, 2008, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Makah-hopeful-about-whaling-again-
by-2010-1261497.php. Only a small fraction of the 620 quota mentioned above was dedicated to the 
Makahs. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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commercial purposes.210 Countries that submitted official and timely 
objections to the IWC’s moratorium are not bound by it and can 
therefore legally engage in commercial whaling.211 Between 1985 and 
2013, Norway, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Iceland commercially hunted 
over 23,000 whales.212 Additionally, Norway increased its commercial 
quota for minke whales from 226 in 1993 to 885 in 2009,213 showing no 
intention of slowing down or ceasing whaling. 
Japan, on the other hand, has taken a completely different route to 
continue whaling, relying on the IWC’s scientific permit exception.214 
Japan’s whaling practices have been controversial,215 and have been 
condemned in many IWC meetings.216 In March 2014, the ICJ found 
Japan in violation of its international law obligations under the ICRW.217 
In its ruling, the ICJ “questioned whether [Japan’s whaling] program was 
really for research, pointing out that it had yielded few scientific 
results.”218 Therefore, the ICJ ordered Japan to suspend all permits and 
halt all whaling in the Southern Ocean.219 In April 2014, Japan 
announced its plan to redesign the research program to address the ICJ’s 
concerns, which would allow Japan to resume whaling.220 
Another IWC member state, which nonetheless continues to whale, 
is Iceland.221 Iceland has always opposed the IWC moratorium, but was 
still bound by it because, unlike Norway, it did not file an official 
objection when the moratorium went into effect in 1986.222 However, in 
1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC in protest over the decision to 
extend the moratorium and subsequently joined NAMMCO.223 In 2002, 
Iceland was readmitted into the IWC and was allowed to file a 
 
 210. The IWC approved a total quota of 1137 whales for aboriginal subsistence between 2008 and 
2012, compared to 3247 of whales hunted for commercial purposes between 2008 and 2012. Compare 
Catch Limits & Catches Taken, supra note 200, with Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under 
Reservation, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/table_objection (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 211. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 421. 
 212. Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under Reservation, supra note 210. 
 213. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1058. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Peter W. Kirby, The Big Lie Behind Japanese Whaling, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/opinion/the-big-lie-behind-japanese-whaling.html?smprod=nytcore-
iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 310–11; Jenkins & Romanzo, 
supra note 119, at 89–90. 
 216. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1059. 
 217. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148, ¶ 233 
(Mar. 31); see Payne, supra note 93. 
 218. See Fackler, supra note 93. 
 219. See Payne, supra note 93. 
 220. See Fackler, supra note 93. 
 221. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 312. 
 222. Id. at 312–14. 
 223. Id. at 312; see Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1062. 
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reservation to the IWC’s moratorium.224 As a result, Iceland is currently 
not bound by the moratorium and continues to whale.225 
Iceland’s withdrawal and readmission with a reservation, Norway’s 
persistent objections, Japan’s misuse of the scientific permit exception, 
and the creation of NAMMCO “call into question the effectiveness, 
[and] indeed the relevance, of the IWC.”226 The IWC has been successful 
in reviving some whale stocks, but many, including former IWC officials 
and ocean policy scholars, have criticized the IWC and its decisions.227 
The international community’s disapproval and dissatisfaction with the 
IWC and its regulations are evident in the continued discussions 
regarding the establishment of regional whaling organizations.228 These 
calls for regional regulatory bodies continue to challenge the legitimacy 
of the IWC.229 
VII.  Solution: Hunting for a Middle Ground 
It appears from the criticism, objections, and fragmentation of the 
international community regarding whaling that the current moratorium 
approach is not effective in accomplishing the entirety of the IWC’s 
vision for the future of whaling. The moratorium has only been 
successful at reviving and conserving certain whale stocks, which is only 
part of what the IWC seeks to achieve. The other part, which the IWC 
has failed to achieve by diverting its attention to a complete moratorium, 
is the control of international whaling through regulations, which 
requires compliance and some level of consensus. Because pro-whaling 
nations have shown an increased frustration with the moratorium, “[t]he 
failure to resolve the current deadlock within the IWC could lead to a 
breakup or even a complete dissolution of the IWC.”230 The continued 
ambiguity regarding the aboriginal subsistence exception further 
exacerbates the situation. To fix the issue, the following steps should be 
taken: (1) the moratorium should be lifted for certain whale stocks; 
(2) the IWC should strengthen its enforcement authority; and (3) the 




 224. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1062. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1059. 
 227. Id. at 1058–59; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 322. 
 228. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 311. 
 229. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1057. 
 230. See Lisa Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on 
Commercial Whaling as the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 Environs Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y J. 177, 205 (2006). 
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A. Lift the Moratorium for Certain Whale Stocks 
The moratorium on whaling was implemented due to concerns with 
diminishing whale stocks.231 In order to determine whether such a 
justification for the moratorium still exists, it is necessary to examine 
scientific data on whale stocks. Recent scientific evidence shows that 
certain whale stocks are healthy enough to resume controlled and 
sustainable whaling.232 Data from the IWC shows that many whale stocks, 
including species that were once “heavily exploited,” have recovered or 
are recovering at an increased annual rate.233 For example, in the North 
Atlantic, humpbacks have recovered to pre-exploitation levels,234 and in 
other parts of the world, humpbacks are recovering at a ten percent 
annual increase rate.235 Other whales, including gray whales in the 
Eastern North Pacific, which the Makahs had hunted, and bowhead 
whales, are also either fully recovered or are in a “healthy state.”236 
Because there is scientific evidence that whale stocks have 
recovered and some are even thought to be healthier than their pre-
exploitation numbers,237 there is no longer a scientific justification for a 
global moratorium. While there may be a justification based on moral or 
ethical grounds, such an argument is unlikely to gain traction because 
pro-whaling countries have shown signs of increased whaling and 
frustration with the current system. Furthermore, some argue that pro-
whaling nations have recently gained support.238 In fact, during the IWC’s 
2005 meeting, twenty-three member states voted in favor of lifting the 
moratorium, twenty-nine voted against it, and five abstained.239 This 
shows that, at least in 2005, nearly half of the member states were either 
in support of or did not oppose lifting the moratorium.240 
Nevertheless, a precautionary approach should be taken with 
certain whale stocks because such an approach “addresses how 
environmental decisions are made in the face of scientific uncertainty.”241 
This precautionary approach, which is gaining traction as a principle of 
international environmental law, is best explained as follows: “Where 
 
 231. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49. 
 232. Status of Whales, supra note 205; see also Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 201. 
 233. Status of Whales, supra note 205. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 208; Tom Clifford, Slaughter Ahead as Whaling Ban May 
End, Gulf News (Mar. 16, 2005), http://gulfnews.com/news/world/other-world/slaughter-ahead-as-
whaling-ban-may-end-1.280924. 
 239. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 208 n.244. 
 240. See Clifford, supra note 238 (citing fifteen member states in 2002 and twenty-one in 2003 
supported lifting moratorium in previous years). 
 241. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 478. 
L - Khoury_12 (Hamilton_12.7) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:06 PM 
December 2015]  WHALING IN CIRCLES  317 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”242 Thus, where there is 
a lack of scientific evidence that a specific whale stock is not yet healthy 
enough for sustainable whaling, and hunting that specific stock might 
lead to serious or irreversible damage, protective measures should be 
applied until scientific evidence proves otherwise. 
To properly apply the precautionary approach and to avoid over-
exploiting whale stocks, an IWC scientific committee should review 
requests for whaling quotas and determine the appropriate outcome. 
Such committee should take a scientific approach when determining a 
quota and rely on studies and data from unbiased and reliable sources. 
The committee should review each request objectively, from a fair and 
impartial position. For example, in the Makahs’ case, the scientific 
committee would base its decision on the status of the Eastern North 
Pacific gray whale stock, the quota requested, and the Makahs’ 
legitimate needs, but not the fact that it is an American request. 
B. Stronger IWC Enforcement Authority 
In order to ensure compliance with IWC regulations, the IWC must 
have enforcement authority because unenforced regulations lead to a 
lack of deterrence which invites a lack of compliance. By lifting the 
moratorium and allowing whaling to resume, the IWC can continue to 
regulate the whaling activity of its member states. The IWC, in and of 
itself, has the potential to effectively control whaling by its member 
states. However, throughout its history, the IWC has consistently been 
criticized for its inability to enforce its own regulations243 “like a sheriff 
without a gun.”244 Currently, the ICRW leaves enforcement entirely up to 
member states, merely providing, “Each Contracting Government shall 
take appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of 
this Convention and the punishment of infractions against the said 
provisions in operations carried out by persons or by vessels under its 
jurisdiction.”245 Additionally, as mentioned earlier in Part III, the United 
States’ enforcement mechanism has not had much success.246 The lack of 
international supervision and the possibility that some member states do 
not domestically enforce the ICRW contribute to the lack of political will 
to cooperate.247 
 
 242. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex I, principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 243. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 421. 
 244. Id. at 424. 
 245. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. IX. 
 246. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20. 
 247. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 217. 
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This problem has two possible solutions. First, the ICRW could be 
amended to include mandatory enforcement and reporting by member 
states. However, such regulations will likely face criticism for being too 
restrictive.248 Moreover, because consent of any affected party is required 
in order to amend the ICRW,249 it is unlikely to be amended in such a 
way. The second and preferred solution is for the IWC to become a 
United Nations body.250 This approach has potential because the United 
Nations Charter (“Charter”) and the General Assembly both have broad 
aims that cover the IWC’s goals. The Charter aims to “establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”251 
Because the IWC imposes obligations on member states as part of a 
treaty, it is covered by the Charter’s aim. Furthermore, the General 
Assembly aims to “promot[e] international co-operation in the 
economic, social, [and] cultural . . . fields.”252 This aim covers the IWC 
because whaling concerns economic, social, and cultural fields. Thus, 
both aims are broad enough to cover the IWC’s efforts of whale 
conservation and regulation. 
With more resources, more influence, and more power, the United 
Nations would be better equipped than the IWC in its present form to 
enforce whaling laws on an international level. That would be especially 
true if the General Assembly were to approve specialized agencies 
focused on whaling because it becomes the General Assembly’s 
responsibility to ensure that such agencies fulfill their functions and 
obligations.253 Therefore, by making the IWC a body of the United 
Nations, the IWC will have more enforcement power and authority to 
implement its post-moratorium regulations. 
C. Clarify the Aboriginal Subsistence Exception Internationally 
and Domestically 
Ambiguous and unclear laws lead to conflicts and inconsistencies. 
The exact definition and scope of the aboriginal subsistence exception on 
the international level remain unclear, leaving the door open for 
inconsistent interpretations.254 As a result of the inconsistent 
interpretations, countries like Japan and Norway contend that the 
United States receives special treatment from the IWC for its aborigines 
 
 248. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 440 (stating that measures that are too restrictive are likely to 
threaten the ICRW). 
 249. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. XXXIX–XLI, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 250. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 217. 
 251. U.N. Charter, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 252. U.N. Charter, art. 13,¶ 1(b) (emphasis added). 
 253. U.N. Charter, art. 57–63. 
 254. See infra Part V. 
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that natives from their countries are denied.255 Moreover, the 
Norwegians, in particular “believe that the IWC has been taken over by 
non-compromising political bodies, particularly under pressure by the 
United States.”256 Evidence shows that certain Japanese and Norwegian 
communities have had a long tradition of whaling, some even longer than 
the Alaskan Inuits and the Makahs.257 Furthermore, even though the 
IWC has recognized the “extreme distress” in which some of those 
Japanese and Norwegian communities live in as a result of the 
moratorium, the IWC has yet to grant those communities an aboriginal 
subsistence quota.258 
In order to make the process of obtaining aboriginal subsistence 
quota more fair, the IWC should implement two changes. First, the IWC 
should amend its definition of the aboriginal subsistence exception to 
grant quotas to aboriginal groups whose traditional subsistence and 
cultural needs have been recognized by the IWC. This definition 
addresses the current ambiguity and clarifies that the IWC is the party 
responsible for the recognition. Second, the IWC should implement an 
unbiased, scientific approach to determine aboriginal subsistence needs. 
The IWC should view communities objectively, and determine their 
statuses under the exception based solely on scientific findings rather 
than on political views. The committee should take into account scientific 
data about quotas requested and the respective whale stocks, whaling 
traditions and cultures, and subsistence needs. This process would 
provide countries with assurance that their communities’ requests for 
quotas receive fair and impartial reviews without undue influence from 
anti-whaling countries like the United States. 
As for a domestic solution to the aboriginal subsistence exception, if 
the United States intends for the Makahs to be able to legally whale, it 
must amend its domestic laws. The United States may do so by providing 
the Makahs with an explicit exception in the MMPA and ensuring that 
future proposals comply with other domestic laws, including NEPA and 
the WCA. Additionally, in order to comply with the Ninth Circuit 
decisions, the U.S. government must objectively evaluate the Makahs’ 
plan and prepare either an EIS or a FONSI in compliance with NEPA 
before representing them at the international level. Further, clarification 
of the aboriginal subsistence exception will leave less room for 
inconsistent interpretations, which will placate international concerns 
about the current system and about the IWC’s perceived preferential 
 
 255. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that Japan has 
attempted to block whaling quotas for other nations until quota for Japanese communities was 
approved); see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 316; Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28. 
 256. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 316. 
 257. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28. 
 258. Id. at 325. 
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treatment of the United States. If the U.S. government wants to be 
perceived as an equal member of the IWC, it must amend its domestic 
laws to fit the Makahs within an exception, present a new proposal to the 
IWC on behalf of the Makahs, and go through the same impartial and 
scientific review process imposed on other countries to obtain a quota. 
Conclusion 
The international community is currently fragmented and divided 
regarding whaling. In order for the U.S. government to allow the Makahs 
to legally resume subsistence whaling, the government must amend its 
domestic laws to include an explicit exception for the Makahs and 
present the IWC with a new proposal. However, allowing the Makahs to 
resume subsistence whaling might set a dangerous precedent that will 
lead to the further disruption of international consensus regarding 
whaling. To solve this problem, the IWC must lift its moratorium and 
allow for specific whale stocks to be hunted under science-based IWC 
regulations. Doing so will enable the IWC to balance monitoring and 
controlling whaling while allowing countries to meet the cultural and 
economic needs of their people. 
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations 
 
EA Environmental Assessment 
EIS Environmental Impact Statement 
FONSI Finding of No Significant Impact 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICRW International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
IWC International Whaling Commission 
MMPA Marine Mammal Protection Act 
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 
NGO Nongovernmental Organization 
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
WCA Whaling Convention Act 
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